The Resource Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective, Roger B. Myerson

Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective, Roger B. Myerson

Label
Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective
Title
Force and restraint in strategic deterrence
Title remainder
a game-theorist's perspective
Statement of responsibility
Roger B. Myerson
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
"In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v
Member of
Cataloging source
GPO
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Myerson, Roger B
Government publication
federal national government publication
Illustrations
charts
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Army War College (U.S.)
Series statement
Advancing strategic thought series
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Deterrence (Strategy)
  • Game theory
  • Games of strategy (Mathematics)
  • International relations
  • Deterrence (Strategy)
Label
Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective, Roger B. Myerson
Instantiates
Publication
Note
  • Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007)
  • "November 2007."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
black and white
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots
Control code
183408773
Extent
vi, 25 pages
Form of item
online
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file.
Specific material designation
remote
System details
Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 12/07/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB823.pdf; current access is available via PURL
Label
Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective, Roger B. Myerson
Publication
Note
  • Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007)
  • "November 2007."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
black and white
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots
Control code
183408773
Extent
vi, 25 pages
Form of item
online
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file.
Specific material designation
remote
System details
Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 12/07/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB823.pdf; current access is available via PURL

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