Coverart for item
The Resource Mental reality, Galen Strawson

Mental reality, Galen Strawson

Label
Mental reality
Title
Mental reality
Statement of responsibility
Galen Strawson
Creator
Author
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet
Member of
Cataloging source
MYG
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Strawson, Galen
Dewey number
128/.2
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
B808.9
LC item number
.S73 2010eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Representation and mind
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Consciousness
  • Behaviorism (Psychology)
  • Mind and body
  • Materialism
  • Philosophy of mind
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • Behaviorism (Psychology)
  • Consciousness
  • Materialism
  • Mind and body
  • Philosophy of mind
  • Filosofie van de geest
  • Bewustzijn
  • Behaviorisme
  • Lichaam en geest
  • Mentale representatie
Label
Mental reality, Galen Strawson
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 1.4
  • 6.1
  • Introduction
  • 6.2
  • Shared abilities?
  • 6.3
  • Sorting ability
  • 6.4
  • Definition of 'mental being'
  • 6.6
  • Mental phenomena
  • Understanding-experience
  • 6.7
  • View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena
  • 7
  • Natural intentionality
  • 7.1
  • Introduction--
  • 7.2
  • E/C intentionality
  • 7.3
  • Experienceless
  • 1.5
  • 7.4
  • Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects
  • 7.5
  • Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality
  • 7.6
  • Concepts in nature
  • 7.7
  • Intentionality and experience
  • 7.8
  • Summary with problem
  • Note about dispositional mental states
  • 7.9
  • Conclusion--
  • 8
  • Pain and 'pain'
  • 8.1
  • Introduction--
  • 8.2
  • Neobehaviorist view
  • 8.3
  • Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior
  • 1.6
  • 8.4
  • Challenge
  • 8.5
  • Sirians
  • 8.6
  • N.N.'s novel
  • 8.7
  • Objection to the Sirians
  • 8.8
  • Betelgeuzians
  • Purely experiential content
  • 8.9
  • Point of the Sirians
  • 8.10
  • Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain
  • 8.11
  • Unpleasantness and qualitative character
  • 9
  • Weather watchers
  • 9.1
  • Introduction--
  • 1.7
  • 9.2
  • Rooting story
  • 9.3
  • What is it like to be a weather watcher?
  • 9.4
  • Aptitudes of mental states
  • 9.5
  • Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space
  • 9.6
  • Argument from the conditions for language ability
  • Account of four seconds of thought
  • 9.7
  • Argument from the nature of desire
  • 9.8 Desire and affect
  • 9.9
  • Argument from the phenomenology of desire
  • 10
  • Behavior
  • 10.1
  • Introduction
  • 10.2
  • 2
  • Hopeless definition
  • 10.3
  • Difficulties
  • 10.4
  • Other-observability
  • 10.5
  • Neo-neobehaviorism
  • 11
  • Concept of mind
  • Three questions
  • 1
  • 2.1
  • Introduction
  • 2.2
  • Mental and the nonmental
  • 2.3
  • Mental and the publicly observable
  • 2.4
  • Mental and the behavioral
  • 2.5
  • Neobehaviorism and reductionism
  • Introduction
  • 2.6
  • Naturalism in the philosophy of mind
  • 2.7
  • Conclusion: The three questions
  • 3
  • Agnostic materialism, part 1
  • 3.1
  • Introduction
  • 3.2
  • Monism
  • 1.1
  • 3.3
  • Linguistic argument
  • 3.4
  • Materialism and M & P monism
  • 3.5
  • Comment on reduction
  • 3.6
  • Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology"
  • 3.7
  • Asymmetry and reduction
  • Default position
  • 3.8
  • Equal-status monism
  • 3.9
  • Panpsychism
  • 3.10
  • Inescapability of metaphysics
  • 4
  • Agnostic materialism, part 2
  • 4.1
  • Ignorance
  • 1.2
  • 4.2
  • Sensory spaces
  • 4.3
  • Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration
  • 4.4
  • Hard part of the mind-body problem
  • 4.5
  • Neutral monism and agnostic monism
  • 4.6
  • Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on
  • Experience
  • 4.7
  • Conclusion--
  • 5
  • Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism
  • 5.1
  • Introduction
  • 5.2
  • Mentalism
  • 5.3
  • Strict or pure process idealism
  • 1.3
  • 5.4
  • Active-principle idealism
  • 5.5
  • Stuff idealism
  • 5.6
  • Immaterialism
  • 5.7
  • Positions restated
  • 5.8
  • Dualist options
  • The character of experience
  • 5.9
  • Summary
  • 5.10
  • Frege's thesis
  • 5.11
  • Objections to pure process idealism
  • 5.12
  • Problem of mental dispositions
  • 6
  • 'Mental'
Control code
503092562
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
2nd ed., with a new appendix.
Extent
1 online resource (xx, 373 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262691833
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
  • 9786612694776
  • 9780262259224
Other physical details
illustrations
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 269477
  • 8434
  • 9780262259224
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)503092562
Label
Mental reality, Galen Strawson
Publication
Copyright
Note
"A Bradford book."
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 1.4
  • 6.1
  • Introduction
  • 6.2
  • Shared abilities?
  • 6.3
  • Sorting ability
  • 6.4
  • Definition of 'mental being'
  • 6.6
  • Mental phenomena
  • Understanding-experience
  • 6.7
  • View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena
  • 7
  • Natural intentionality
  • 7.1
  • Introduction--
  • 7.2
  • E/C intentionality
  • 7.3
  • Experienceless
  • 1.5
  • 7.4
  • Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects
  • 7.5
  • Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality
  • 7.6
  • Concepts in nature
  • 7.7
  • Intentionality and experience
  • 7.8
  • Summary with problem
  • Note about dispositional mental states
  • 7.9
  • Conclusion--
  • 8
  • Pain and 'pain'
  • 8.1
  • Introduction--
  • 8.2
  • Neobehaviorist view
  • 8.3
  • Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior
  • 1.6
  • 8.4
  • Challenge
  • 8.5
  • Sirians
  • 8.6
  • N.N.'s novel
  • 8.7
  • Objection to the Sirians
  • 8.8
  • Betelgeuzians
  • Purely experiential content
  • 8.9
  • Point of the Sirians
  • 8.10
  • Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain
  • 8.11
  • Unpleasantness and qualitative character
  • 9
  • Weather watchers
  • 9.1
  • Introduction--
  • 1.7
  • 9.2
  • Rooting story
  • 9.3
  • What is it like to be a weather watcher?
  • 9.4
  • Aptitudes of mental states
  • 9.5
  • Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space
  • 9.6
  • Argument from the conditions for language ability
  • Account of four seconds of thought
  • 9.7
  • Argument from the nature of desire
  • 9.8 Desire and affect
  • 9.9
  • Argument from the phenomenology of desire
  • 10
  • Behavior
  • 10.1
  • Introduction
  • 10.2
  • 2
  • Hopeless definition
  • 10.3
  • Difficulties
  • 10.4
  • Other-observability
  • 10.5
  • Neo-neobehaviorism
  • 11
  • Concept of mind
  • Three questions
  • 1
  • 2.1
  • Introduction
  • 2.2
  • Mental and the nonmental
  • 2.3
  • Mental and the publicly observable
  • 2.4
  • Mental and the behavioral
  • 2.5
  • Neobehaviorism and reductionism
  • Introduction
  • 2.6
  • Naturalism in the philosophy of mind
  • 2.7
  • Conclusion: The three questions
  • 3
  • Agnostic materialism, part 1
  • 3.1
  • Introduction
  • 3.2
  • Monism
  • 1.1
  • 3.3
  • Linguistic argument
  • 3.4
  • Materialism and M & P monism
  • 3.5
  • Comment on reduction
  • 3.6
  • Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology"
  • 3.7
  • Asymmetry and reduction
  • Default position
  • 3.8
  • Equal-status monism
  • 3.9
  • Panpsychism
  • 3.10
  • Inescapability of metaphysics
  • 4
  • Agnostic materialism, part 2
  • 4.1
  • Ignorance
  • 1.2
  • 4.2
  • Sensory spaces
  • 4.3
  • Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration
  • 4.4
  • Hard part of the mind-body problem
  • 4.5
  • Neutral monism and agnostic monism
  • 4.6
  • Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on
  • Experience
  • 4.7
  • Conclusion--
  • 5
  • Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism
  • 5.1
  • Introduction
  • 5.2
  • Mentalism
  • 5.3
  • Strict or pure process idealism
  • 1.3
  • 5.4
  • Active-principle idealism
  • 5.5
  • Stuff idealism
  • 5.6
  • Immaterialism
  • 5.7
  • Positions restated
  • 5.8
  • Dualist options
  • The character of experience
  • 5.9
  • Summary
  • 5.10
  • Frege's thesis
  • 5.11
  • Objections to pure process idealism
  • 5.12
  • Problem of mental dispositions
  • 6
  • 'Mental'
Control code
503092562
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
2nd ed., with a new appendix.
Extent
1 online resource (xx, 373 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262691833
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
  • 9786612694776
  • 9780262259224
Other physical details
illustrations
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 269477
  • 8434
  • 9780262259224
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)503092562

Library Locations

    • Thomas Jefferson LibraryBorrow it
      1 University Blvd, St. Louis, MO, 63121, US
      38.710138 -90.311107
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