The Resource Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao
Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao
Resource Information
The item Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Missouri-St. Louis Libraries.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Missouri-St. Louis Libraries.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Extent
- xii, 217 pages
- Contents
-
- 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings
- 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism
- 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships
- 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players
- 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players
- 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925-1928
- 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928-1931
- 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential Government, 1931-1937
- 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective
- Isbn
- 9780824817213
- Label
- Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China
- Title
- Power by design
- Title remainder
- constitution-making in Nationalist China
- Statement of responsibility
- Suisheng Zhao
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- Annotation
- Cataloging source
- DLC
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
- 1954-
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Zhao, Suisheng
- Dewey number
- 320.951/09/041
- Government publication
- government publication of a state province territory dependency etc
- Index
- index present
- LC call number
- JQ1522
- LC item number
- .Z43 1996
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
- bibliography
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- Constitutional history
- Taiwan
- Summary expansion
- First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are driven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government
- Label
- Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-210) and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
- 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925-1928 -- 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928-1931 -- 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential Government, 1931-1937 -- 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective
- Control code
- 32702474
- Dimensions
- 22 cm
- Extent
- xii, 217 pages
- Isbn
- 9780824817213
- Isbn Type
- (alk. paper)
- Lccn
- 95023127
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- n
- Label
- Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-210) and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
- 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925-1928 -- 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928-1931 -- 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential Government, 1931-1937 -- 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective
- Control code
- 32702474
- Dimensions
- 22 cm
- Extent
- xii, 217 pages
- Isbn
- 9780824817213
- Isbn Type
- (alk. paper)
- Lccn
- 95023127
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- n
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Power-by-design--constitution-making-in/n26C_m2m2xU/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Power-by-design--constitution-making-in/n26C_m2m2xU/">Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China, Suisheng Zhao</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.umsl.edu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.umsl.edu/">University of Missouri-St. Louis Libraries</a></span></span></span></span></div>
