Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power, Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law

Resource Information

The instance Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power, Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law represents a material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in University of Missouri-St. Louis Libraries. This resource is a combination of several types including: Instance, Electronic.

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Label

Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power, Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law

Title remainder

the political foundations of shareholder power

Statement of responsibility

Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law

Instantiates

• Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power

Publication

• Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013

Note

Includes index

Bibliography note

Includes bibliographical references (pages xi-xiii) and index

Carrier category

online resource

Carrier category code

• cr

Carrier MARC source

rdacarrier

Content category

text

Content type code

• txt

Content type MARC source

rdacontent

Contents

• List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; Part I Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World; 1 Introduction and Overview; 2 Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance; A. Functionalism and Contextualism; B. Failing Better; 3 The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions; A. The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Stewards; II. Enlightened Shareholder Value; III. Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance; B. The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Spectators
• II. Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder InterestsIII. Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance; C. Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance; Part II A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 4 Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance; A. Economics; B. Politics; I. "Law Matters"; II. Social Democracy; III. Institutions; IV. "Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities; V. Coalitions; VI. Political Parties and Political Salience
• VII. Extra-Corporate Stakeholder ProtectionsC. Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 5 Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy; A. The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy; B. The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy; C. Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium; Part III The Theory's Explanatory Domain; 6 Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; A. Mapping the Explanatory Domain
• B. The Evolving Shareholder BaseC. Postcrisis Austerity; D. Postcrisis Coalitions; 7 Conclusions; Index

Control code

840472906

Dimensions

unknown

Extent

1 online resource

Form of item

online

Isbn

9781107347786

Media category

computer

Media MARC source

rdamedia

Media type code

• c

http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId

471584

Record ID

.b129683905

Specific material designation

remote

System control number

(OCoLC)840472906